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2ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the feasibility of developing a bankers'
acceptance market in Hong Kong to serve two main purposes: to fill the
expanding trade-credit needs of Hong Kong's export sector and to provide
a suitable vehicle for adjustment of short-term liquidity needs of the
financial sector.
After an introduction to the relevant concepts and practices of
the bankers' acceptance and its secondary market, the thesis explains
why and how such a market is needed in Hong Kong to serve the two main
purposes. Before a conclusion on the desirability and feasibility of
the bankers' acceptance market is reached, the possible impacts of its
presence are studied and the attendant costs and benefits to the inter-
ested are examined.
The writer comes to the conclusion that the possible development
of an active bankers' acceptance market in Hong Kong is conditional on
the support of the Hong Kong Government and the largest commercial bank
in Hong Kong.
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11.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose and Scope of the Feasibility Study
The main purpose of this feasibility study is twofold: to in-
vestigate whether the legitimate needs for expansion of trade credits in
Hong Kong's exports can be filled by the development of the bankers'
acceptance market and to determine whether the bankers' acceptance, as
a money market instrument, could provide an important means of adjusting
short-term liquidity in the local financial sector.
The study further analyses the possible impacts that the develop-
ment of the bankers' acceptance market would have on various sectors of
the economy. After the assessment of these impacts as well as the costs
and benefits associated with the bankers' acceptance market, a conclusion
is then drawn on whether this market is feasible and, indeed, desirable
for Hong Kong in the near future.
1.2 Use of Bankers' Acceptance
What is the Bankers' Acceptance
The bankers' acceptance is a time draft (or a bill of exchange)
which has been drawn on and accepted--that is, guaranteed--by a banking
institution. By its acceptance, the bank becomes primarily liable for
the payment of the draft at its maturity--that is, the bank becomes the
primary obligorl. Bankers' acceptances arise from a short-term credit
1The drawer remains secondarily liable.
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arrangement primarily designed to enable businesses to obtain funds to
finance commercial transactions. They have maturities of six months or
less, reflecting the time required to finance the shipment of the mer-
chandise and to distribute the merchandise into the trade channels. The
face of the instrument specifies the dollar amount involved, the maturity
date and the nature of the underlying transaction. The bank's obligation
to pay at maturity makes the acceptance a readily marketable instrument.
Therefore, a secondary market for bankers' acceptances can be created by
banks selling some of the-accepted drafts in their holdings.
Bankers' Acceptance: A Definition
The term bankers' acceptance is chiefly used in the United States.
An official definition is provided by the Board of Governors of the
United States Federal Reserve System in Regulation A (7, p.68): A bank-
ers' acceptance is a draft or bill of exchange, whether payable in dollars
or some other money, accepted by a bank or trust company or a firm, person,
company or corporation engaged generally in the business of granting
bankers' acceptance credits. Bank acceptance is the acceptance obligation
of a bank or trust company engaged also in banking, whereas bankers' ac-
ceptance is a broader term including those of other acceptor firms in the
business, referred to as discount houses.
Acceptances and Bills
Bankers' acceptances are sometimes referred to as acceptances.
However, the use of the general term may be misleading in some instances
as this term also refers to trade acceptances as well. Trade acceptances
are time drafts drawn on and accepted by a trading firm, as opposed to
acceptance by a banking institution. Usually the name of a business firm
.is much less well known than the name of a bank. Therefore, trade
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acceptances are much less readily marketable than bankers' acceptances.
Hence, a secondary market for trade acceptances is much less viable.
Bankers' acceptances are often called bills or bankers' bills in
the United States. However, bill is a commonly accepted term in the
United Kingdom and other parts of the world. The British have developed
a proliferation of terminology for various types of bills in their long
history in London--such as agency bills, fine bank bills, foreign domi-
cile bills etc. (6). Basically, there are three types of bills: bank
bills, trade bills and finance bills. Bank bills are drawn on and ac-
cepted by banks, trade bills by commercial houses for trade financing
and finance bills by businesses for capital and non-trade financing.
All three types of bills are traded in the discount market. Bank bills
are further subdivided into fine bank bills and non-eligible bank bills.
The Bank of England accepts fine bank bills from discount houses as
collateral for loans, whereas non-eligible bank bills are not accepted.
However, most bankers' acceptances in the United States that are traded
in the open market are eligible for discount at the Federal Reserve banks.
Adopting the term bankers' acceptance in this study, the writer
indicates a preference for developing an instrument which is based on the
bankers' acceptance in the United States rather than the bank bill in the
United Kingdom. The bankers' acceptance seems more suited to a less so-
phisticated money market like that of Hong Kong.
Bankers' Acceptance for Trade Financing
The bankers' acceptance market in the United States developed
with the Federal Reserve Board's recognition of the necessity to furnish
an elastic supply of bank credit to better accommodate the needs of
commerce and industry. Also, the Board recognised the importance of
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acceptance credit in international trade and commerce and the dangers of
overextension of credit and of speculation (5, pp. 43-44). The Board
promoted this important sector of the money market as early as 1916 by
becoming a substantial purchaser and holder of bankers' acceptances
through the Federal Reserve banks (7, p. 68). The Board set up regula-
tions which restricted the Federal Reserve banks to discount bankers'
acceptances only for purposes of financing the production, storage and
marketing of goods. In this way it excluded discounting facilities of
bankers' acceptances for fixed capital financing and for speculative
purposes. Restriction was also placed on the term of maturity, which
is up to a maximum length of six months. As a comparison, the Bank of
England also only discounts fine bank bills for more or less the same
purposes (8), (9).
The active promotion of bankers' acceptance for trade financing
by central banks is not the only reason for its popular use in trade fi-
nancing. By itself, the bankers' acceptance is well suited for trade,
especially for transactions involving businesses in different countries
where credit standings fo the trading parties are not so well known to
each other. Hence, the substitution of a bank for the buyer-importer as
the obligor to pay the seller-exporter at maturity becomes an important
consideration in closing the transaction. However, its use in domestic
commerce is somewhat cumbersome because of the documentation that is
usually required.
From the business firm's viewpoint, acceptance credit is an al-
ternative to the bank's credit line. To protect itself from times of
tight bank credit, a business firm should find it advantageous to have
access to a line of acceptance credit. The possession of an acceptance
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credit line could also give more leverage in negotiating a better in-
terest rate for bank loans. Moreover, the demand for bankers' acceptances
by investors may mean that such financing is relatively cheap at times.
However, it should be stressed that the role of the acceptance is not
to outweigh the overdraft, but to supplement it (8, p. 1505).
From the bank's standpoint, bankers' acceptances can be used to
accommodate a large credit demand: several drafts may be drawn and in-
dividually distributed among a group of participating dealers and inves-
tors. Moreover, the holding of bankers' acceptances is also an important
means in adjusting the bank's liquidity position. Since bankers' accept-
ances can be readily discounted in cash but bear some interest, they are
more desirable to hold than excess cash which is not interest-bearing.
Financing for the Exporter
The most common transaction giving rise to acceptance financing
is an import-export transaction. Acceptances can be used to finance
either end of such a transaction--either the importer or the exporter.
The following sequence of events outlines the procedure of a transaction
with importation of goods from an overseas exporter to a local importer.
1. The importer goes to his bank and requests the issuance of a letter
of credit to the overseas exporter. The letter of credit instructs
the exporter to draw a time draft--that is, a draft payable on a
fixed future date--on the importer's bank or on a correspondent bank
overseas which has agreed to confirm the credit.
2. Satisfied that its customer is creditworthy, the issuing bank issues
the letter of credit and forwards it to the overseas exporter. This
procedure usually is done through an advising correspondent bank,
which will commonly be the confirming bank if the credit is to be
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confirmed.
3. The overseas exporter then prepares the shipment and presents the
time draft, accompanied by the required documents, to the issuing
bank through his own bank.
4. If the documents are in order, the issuing bank separates the docu-
ments from the draft and forwards the documents to the importer so
that he can obtain the goods. At the same time, the bank accepts
the draft, thereby assuming primary liability to pay the face amount
at maturity. The bank then re-delivers the draft to the exporter who
can obtain immediate cash payment by discounting it in the acceptance
market.
5. At the maturity of the draft the holder then presents the draft to
the drawee (the issuing bank) who pays it, having obtained funds for
the purpose under the terms of the importer's agreement with the is-
suing bank. If the importer had defaulted, however, the bank's com-
mitment to the holder of the draft at maturity remains irrevocable.
The sequence of events enables the importer to take advantage of
deferred payment terms granted by the exporter but at the same time en-
ables the exporter to obtain payment immediately. Functionally, this pro-
cedure is equivalent to the exporter obtaining financing of accounts
receivable.
Financing for the Importer
If the bankers' acceptance is to finance the importer, the trans-
action may develop as follows:
1. As before, the importer applies to his bank for the issuance of a
letter of credit, but this time the draft to be drawn under the cre-
dit is to be payable at sight. The advances by the issuing bank that
7pays the draft will be refinanced by a bankers' acceptance.
2. As before with a letter of credit arrangement, the beneficiary
(seller) ships the goods. Through arrangement with his own bank,
the beneficiary then presents the draft with the appropriate docu-
ments to the issuing bank.
3. This time, assuming that the documents are in order, the issuing
(or sometimes the confirming) bank, rather than accepting the drafts
and returning them to the exporter, pays him cash instead.
4. At this stage, the importer will not be required to refund the is-
suing bank. Upon payment by the issuing bank for this sight draft
drawn under the letter of credit, the importer will draw a time draft
on the issuing bank in favor of himself. The issuing bank will then
accept the time draft and pay the exporter. The bank may either
hold the acceptance in its own portfolio or discount it in the market.
5. Under the acceptance agreement, the importer will have to put the
bank in funds one day prior to the maturity of the acceptance.
The end result of this procedure has essentially the same effects
of financing the importer's inventory. It should be noted that in both
of these cases, the bank has effectively made its credit available to the
exporter or the importer, but unless it has itself discounted the accept-
ance issued, the bank has not disbursed any of its own funds.
Other Variations
The foregoing are two most common examples of how acceptances can
be created. There are numerous ways by which acceptances can grow out of




Acceptance credit may also finance the accumulation of goods by
an exporter who has contracted to ship them abroad within a reasonable
time.
Post-import Financing
Acceptances may also be used to finance an importer until he can
distribute the goods into the trade channels. In this case, an importer
may arrange for a bank to finance the temporary carrying of imported
goods which are expected to move within a relatively short time.
Third-country Financing
Acceptances may also be used to finance transactions that do not
involve domestic exporters and importers but for the shipment of merchan-
dise between two foreign countries. In the 1960's, Japan made extensive
use of the New York acceptance market to finance its rapid expansion of
trade. Obviously, the use of dollar acceptances was a cheaper way of
financing than what would have been available in Japan (17, pp. 110-112).
1.3 Open Market for Bankers' Acceptance
Bankers' Acceptance--High Quality
Liquid Asset
The establishment of an active open (secondary) market in which
bankers' acceptances could be traded--that is, could be bought and sold
at the going market rates--is a pre-requisite in acceptance financing.
Unlike loans and advances made out to customers, banks could reckon their
holdings in bankers' acceptances as highly liquid assets that can be
immediately turned into cash without appreciable losses whenever liquidity
pressure develops.
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What makes the bankers' acceptance such a highly liquid asset--
in fact, what makes an active bankers' acceptance market--is essentially
the blessing of the central bank. This is true in most established mar-
kets of the world. The fact that some bank bills are eligible for dis-
count with the Bank of England necessarily makes them more liquid than
others as well as command better rates. in the market (8, p. 1505). This
is'also true in the United States market, whose development was a dis-
tinct result of active promotion by the Federal Reserve Board. The pro-
motional efforts used by the Board were to have the Federal Reserve banks
stand ready in buying and selling eligible acceptances (7, pp. 68-69).
This is equally true in the Japanese market, which has developed rapidly
since its inception on May 20, 1971, when the Bank of Japan began to buy
bills of comparatively long term (2, pp. 103-104).
In the United States, over the five-year period between 1968 and
1972, rates for prime 90-day bankers' acceptances were usually higher
than those for the U.S. Treasury bills but the acceptance rates were
rather close to and sometimes lower than Federal funds and commercial
papers of similar maturities (15). In London, fine bank bills command
lower discount rates than sterling certificates of deposits of the same
maturities, while the 'ineligible' bank bills, because of their non-
discountability with the Bank of England, yield about the same discount
rates as these certificates of deposits. However, both markets, while
active, have much smaller outstanding volumes when compared to other
money market instruments of similar maturities--for example, the nego-
tiable certificates of deposits and commercial papers (6), (8, pp. 1506-
1507). The explanation of the small size of the bankers' acceptance mar-
ket lies in the highly specialized nature of the instrument itself rather
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than the reflection on its quality. As a matter of fact, there is not
one single investor on record who ever lost his investment in bankers'
acceptances, even during the severe financial crisis of 1931 when nu-
merous U.S. banks failed (20, p.5).
Other than the eligibility of bankers' acceptances for discount-
ing at Federal Reserve banks, three important factors also contribute to
the worth of this marketable instrument. The first factor is that the
bank must pay in full amount upon maturity of this instrument. This
obligation is properly recorded on the bank's balance sheet as a Lia-
bility on Acceptances (20, p. 5). This liability remains unaltered
regardless of prepayment or even default by the customer as long as the
acceptance itself has not been repurchased by the bank at maturity.
Another factor is that the Federal Reserve Board has specific regulations
which restrict the outstanding amount of acceptance liabilities a bank
may have at any time (7, p. 69). The third factor--perhaps, the most
important one--is the restrictive nature of the drawer's liability, being
based on the self-liquidating nature of the underlying commercial trans-
action. As the drawer is secondarily liable in case the bank defaults on
the payment, the self-liquidating actual investment should at least offer
some extra protection for the investor. Furthermore, because finance
bills are not discountable, the speculative use of this money market
instrument is greatly reduced.
Bankers' Acceptance--its Drawbacks
Despite the quality and liquid aspects in their use, bankers'
acceptances have certain drawbacks from an investor's standpoint. First,
bankers' acceptances are normally denominated in comparatively small and
odd amounts characteristic of most trade transactions. Therefore, they
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appear less attractive and less convenient to handle when compared to
other short-term instruments such as the negotiable certificates of de-
posits and commercial papers that are denominated in large and round
sums. Second, they sometimes lack the maturities that investors require.
Third, the supply of bankers' acceptances may not be sufficient enough
to meet the demands of investors. The uncertainty in supply is due to
several factors: the cost differential between bank borrowing and accept-
ance financing, the liquidity situation of banks and the patterns of trade.
While the last drawback is an inherent characteristic of the instrument,
the first two drawbacks have been somewhat overcome by banks that operate
on the pooled fund concept. Such banks accumulate items of the same
maturity from which sales can be made in conveniently denominated amounts.
However, the overhead costs of such operations are necessarily higher and
have to be passed on to the customers.
Market Operation
As in other money or capital markets, the bankers' acceptance
market consists of borrowers (suppliers of the credit instrument), lenders
or investors (suppliers of credit) and some agents or institutions that
bring together the borrowers and the lenders. However, institutional
practices vary from market to market. Two of the major acceptance markets,
the United States market and the London market, are described as follows.
The United States Market
The United States bankers' acceptance market is 'made' by a
small group of dealers--about ten in number--in New York City. Each
dealer stands ready to buy and sell acceptances for his own account.
Most dealers trade acceptances at relatively stable posted rates, gener-
ally with one-fourth of one percent between the bid and offer rates.
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Instead of holding acceptances to maturity, these dealers seek their
profits by high-volume, rapid turnover in inventory.
Although borrowers from this market are essentially trading
firms, the suppliers of the credit instrument are mainly the accepting
banks which discount the drafts. Instead of holding all the discounted
bills in their own portfolio, the banks usually rediscount a portion of
their portfolio holdings--either to their own customers and other banks
or to the bill dealers. Banks that are actively engaged in the accepting
business, although not necessarily the largest, are the ones well known
and active in the market. This is so because of the highly specialized
nature of this type of financing. Also, their names on the acceptances
are able to command prime rates in the market.
Investors in the secondary market for bankers' acceptances are
many and diverse. Both accepting and nonaccepting banks are major buyers
of other banks' acceptances. They regard bankers' acceptances as a good
investment when rates on acceptances are relatively attractive compared
to other short-term instruments. Foreign central and commercial banks
usually engage in swapping operations with the dealers. Other financial
institutions such as the savings and loans associations, savings banks,
insurance companies also invest because of high yields and other reasons.
Corporations, funds and foundations, and individuals are other investors
in the market. The Federal Reserve System carries out open market opera-
tion through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York which buys and sells
for its own account as well as for its foreign correspondents. Published
data of rates, volumes and holdings by various sectors can be found in
the United States Federal Reserve Bulletin published regularly every
month (14). (15), (17), (20).
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The London Market
Bank bills in England are traded in the bill discount market
which sells two credit instruments: commercial bills of exchange and
treasury bills. The participators in the bank bill discount market are
the accepting houses, the bills brokers, the discount houses and the
Bank of England, as well as other investors.
The accepting houses are mainly merchant banks that are members
of the Accepting Houses Committee. They are some of the most reputable
merchant bankers in England (8, p. 1507). The clearing banks rarely
sell bills discounted for their clients or purchase bills in the open
market. Overseas and foreign banks in London also help in the supply of
bills.
Bill brokers are agents who serve to bring together buyers and
sellers of bills. Discount houses, about twelve in number, have bills
discounted and then resold to the clearing banks which hold them as liq-
uid assets to maturity. These houses also 'make' the market for inves-
tors of short-term funds.
The Bank of England, acting as a lender of last resort to the
discount houses, is not directly involved in the open market operation
of bank bills. However, the Bank sets the regulations for eligibility
of bills as collateral for loans to discount houses, thereby restricting
the nature of transactions. Hence, finance bills are not eligible for
use as collateral. Also, the Bank may choose to buy eligible bank bills
from discount houses instead of providing direct loans using the bills as
collateral. Other types of financial institutions in the United Kingdom,
individuals and commercial banks outside the United Kingdom also invest
in the London bill market (1), (4), (6), (8).
14
Profit Dynamics
The cost of acceptance financing consists of a commission fee
plus other charges for handling and discounting the accepted drafts. For
prime customers (not necessarily the same class of prime customers for
bank loans), the commission charge of American banks is usually one and
one-half percent, but higher rates may be charged for others (14, p. 67).
The rate of discount charged is normally the going market bid rate of
acceptance dealers for the appropriate maturity. Usually, the cost of
financing is defrayed either by the party arranging for the credit or as
agreed upon in the contract.
From the borrower's viewpoint, a comparison of relative costs
between acceptance credit and bank credit is often necessary. Such a
comparison must take into account the indirect cost of maintaining com-
pensating balances for direct loans. Also, it should be noted that the
rate on a bankers' acceptance, as quoted in the market, refers to the
percentage discount from par. Thus, a bankers' acceptance quoted at ten
percent discount rate has an effective borrowing rate 11.1 per cent.
Moreover, it should be noted that while a one and one-half percent is
chargeable to all customers for acceptance commission, some customers
cannot borrow from banks at the prime rate.
From the accepting bank's viewpoint, the commission charges in-
clude, other than handling charges as mentioned above, the premium on
default risk and money riskl. Of course, the bank does not have the money
risk if it holds the discounted draft to maturity in its own portfolio.
1The money risk stems from the fact, as interest rates rise, the
prices on outstanding debt securities decline (3, p. 407).
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Whereas the broker charges a small percentage fee for matching
sellers with buyers, the dealer makes his profit by dealing at one-fourth
of one percent spread between the bid and offer rates. Although dealers
take positions in the market, they do not normally hold bankers' accept-
ances to maturity. They make their living by trading high volumes with
rapid turnover.
The yield to the investor on bankers' acceptances is somewhat
higher than that of the United States Treasury bills of matching maturi-
ties. Because the item is discounted from par, the investment yields a
slightly higher return than a coupon-bearing instrument purchased at par
with the coupon rate equal to the bill discount rate. In addition, the
quoted rate on an acceptance, calculated on a 360-day year basis, slight-
ly understates the investor's effective yield on an annual rate (365-day)
basis. For example, for the 51-, per cent rate of discount on an accept-
ance maturing in seventy-five days, the investor's realized bond equivalent
yield is 5.64 per cent (20).
1.4 Bankers' Acceptance in Hong Kong
Commenting on the future of money markets, Paul Einzig wrote in
1972: In all probability countries with modern and advanced financial
systems such as the whole of Western Europe and Japan, South Africa, Hong
Kong, Singapore, etc., are likely to step up their progress towards the
achievement of much more advanced money markets. In particular their
bill markets, which leave much to be desired if indeed they exist at all,
have an ample scope for improvement. Considering that they have all made
remarkable economic progress since their recovery from the effects of the
war, and that they have highly developed banking systems and strong
currencies, the requirements and possibilities for the expansion and
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diversification of their money market facilities are there, and it is
only a question of time before much fuller use will come to be made of
their potentialities in this sphere (l, p. 247).
Since the time of the above writing, however, the Japanese bill
discount market has expanded rapidly since its inception. The volume of
funds in the market was reported to be x€300 billion at the end of 1971
and 'Y600 billion on March 31, 1972. The Bank of Japan has made efforts
to promote further development of the bill discount market by conducting
purchase operations of bills of comparatively long term. Its develop-
ment has been fostered by the monetary authorities as an alternative
source of funds to the call money market, and banks have had an addi-
tional option in the management of their short-term funds(2, p. 100 and
pp. 104-105),
The Japanese bill market, as well as the other bill markets (1),
has developed out of the recognition of the monetary authorities for a
more flexible and diversified money market structure. The lack of a bill
market in Hong Kong may be attributed to the laissez faire policy of the
government administration, but other factors also come into play.
Until the early 1970's, money had been cheap and easy to get.
Credit needs of the industrial and commercial sectors were satisfactorily
filled by the stable and expanding banking system. Furthermore, export
trade was financed mainly by the overseas buyers through the letter of
credit. Discounted bills, which were never a significant fraction of the
banks' short-term asset portfolio, were held to maturity. However, chang-
ing conditions of international trade and finance are beginning to press
for corresponding changes in Hong Kong in the coming years there seems to
be a growing need for other forms of export trade financing. Chapter 2.0
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examines such needs in Hong Kong.
Acceptance financing could only be used extensively when redis-
counting facilities are available. The lack of a bill discount market
in Hong Kong in the 1960's and the early 1970's could be attributed to
the relative lack of sophistication in Hong Kong's financial institutional
framework. However, the rapid development of the capital market in 1972
and the influx of a large number of reputable merchant (investment) banks
have now opened up opportunities for corresponding development in the
Hong Kong money market. Chapter 3,0 takes a closer look at the liquidity
problems faced by the financial institutions and discusses the possibility
of developing the bankers' acceptance market as an initial step towards
a more developed money market. Chapter 4.0 examines the impacts, costs
and benefits of a Hong Kong bankers' acceptance market. Chapter 5.0 sums
up and concludes the feasibility study.
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2.0 A GROWING CHALLENGE TO HONG KONG:
EXPORT TRADE FINANCING
2.1 Export Trade Financing in Hong Kong
Up to now, the letter of credit has been the main vehicle for
international trade. In Hong Kong, although official statistics are
lacking, its overwhelming popularity in export trade can perhaps be at-
tested by the frequency it is mentioned in the export business.
By a rough estimation, the letter of credit is probably used for
75 per cent to 85 per cent of Hong Kong's exports. Hong Kong's exports
for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1974 (16) amount to HK$28,131 million.
In the same period of time, Hong Kong Export Credit Insurance Corporation
recorded a total export insurance valued HK$1,510 million, which is about
5.4 per cent of the annual export. The Corporation is a government agency
which insures exporters against certain risks arising from D/A, D/P and
open-account transactionsl. It is estimated that an additional 10 per cent
to 20 per cent of total exports are D/A, D/P and open-account transactions
not covered by the export credit insurance scheme: these transactions are
usually between companies having well-established business liaison or be-
tween parent and subsidiaries. Therefore, the above estimation of 75 per
cent to 85 per cent seems a quite reasonable figure (See Figure 2.1).
1D./A and D/P stand for documents against acceptance and documents
against payment respectively. D/A, D/P and open-account give the exporter
a greater credit exposure and also require the exporter to finance a longer
period in the transaction as compared to the letter of credit.
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letter-of-credit transactions75%-85%
(percentage obtained by estimation)
Hong Kong
Annual
D/A, D/P and open-account transactionsExports
not covered by HKECIC (estimated)10%-20%
Exports covered by HKECIC (Hong Kong
Export Credit Insurance Corporation).5.4%
Percentage based on value of export
covered for the fiscal year ending
March 31, 1974.
Fig. 2.1--A Breakdown of Hong Kong's Exports
(in value-term) by basis of transaction
The widespread use of the letter of credit is due to the maximum
protection it gives to the exporter. In many transactions, the credit
standing of a customer may not be well known or the importing country may
be politically unstable. Under these circumstances, the irrevocable and
perhaps confirmed letter of credit is needed as a guarantee for payment.
Traditionally, Hong Kong exporters have usually asked for the
letter of credit as a term of sales. In addition to the extra protection
afforded by the letter of credit, this term of sales may also help ease
the financing needs. In executing an order, Hong Kong exporters often
utilize the letter of credit to obtain packing credit1 from banks to
1Packing credit is used to provide the seller working capital.
The seller negotiates a bank loan with a bank prior the production using
the letter of credit as collateral.
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finance the purchase of materials and the work in progress. If packing
credit is not used, the exporter could present the letter of credit and
the necessary documents for discount at his bank once the merchandise is
loaded on board the vessel. Therefore, in practice, the bank usually
becomes the financing agent for the shipment of merchandise.
However, the letter of credit has certain disadvantages for the
buyer. One drawback is that the buyer's line of credit with his bank may
be tied up during the validity period of the letter-of-credit transaction.
The procedures in issuing a letter of credit and the attendant charges
involved are the other minus factors for the buyer. In the past overseas
buyers were quite willing to concede letter-of-credit terms to Hong Kong
exporters because Hong Kong products were competitively priced. However,
in the fast-changing conditions of world trade, to insist on the letter
of credit as a condition for sales may become less appropriate as com-
petitive pressures mount.
2.2 Impact of External changes on Hong Kong
The first and foremost change affecting Hong Kong is the dimin-
ishing price-competitiveness of its products. Today Hong Kong can no
longer sell at low prices like its regional competitors. Countries such
as Taiwan and South Korea are now making substantial inroads in Hong
Kong's established overseas markets in products like textiles, garments
and electronics. This situation can be mainly attributed to Hong Kong's
escalating labor costs in the past seven years and to several currency
revaluations of the Hong Kong dollar since 1971 vis-a-vis these countries
(19). This changing competitive position in export. trade undoubtedly
poses some real threats to the further growth of Hong Kong, which relies
on its visible export earnings for one-half of its gross domestic product
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(18). However, as Hong Kong continues to upgrade its production tech-
nology and product quality, it may gradually ease itself from the com-
petitive pressure of its regional competitors. On the other hand, it
will have to face new challenges and competition from other quarters.
Competition with sellers in the domestic markets of the United
States, Western Europe and Japan calls for new skills and new strategies
from Hung Kong's exporters. Granted that Hong Kong has both the manage-
rial and technological know-how to meet this up-and-coming competition
from the domestic side in these advanced-technology markets, it should'
be understood that the overseas seller is handicapped by more than the
mere. distance separating -the manufacturer from the market. In the words
of W. H. Walker, the former Commissioner of the Hong Kong Export Credit
Insurance Corporation:
This competition not only involves the price and
the quality' of the goods, but also the terms of pay-
ment on which they are sold there is a growing
trend for these to be credit terms. Not infrequently
the terms are more important than the price (9).
The above statement sums up the many situations in which buyers with a
leveraged capital structure usually prefer the seller to give credit to
ease their own financing burden. Under these circumstances, a price
discount equivalent to the interest charge difference cannot be a good
substitute for credit. However, before Hong Kong exporters could grant
competitive credit terms to some of these overseas buyers, the exporters
will need to expand their existing financial facilities.
Another potential development may force Hong Kong to sell its
exports on credit terms. In Business Week (October 12, 1974), an American
weekly magazine, the plight of the debt economy--the United States
economy--was highlighted in striking detail. Over the past decade,
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both corporations and consumers have gone on a borrowing binge. Cor-
porate debt has tripled in 15 years, and consumer debt has soared 50%
the past three years (10, p. 44). Also in the recent years, rampant
inflation and an arid equities market have forced major U.S. corporations
into taking on smothering levels of debt to finance their growth (10,
p. 56). Consequently, the magazine prognosticates that the United States
economy may soon be approaching a point of overborrowing.
If this point is indeed not too far off, then the implications
could be quite serious for the Hong Kong economy. In fact, such a devel-
opment would be quite inevitable when seen as a series of pressure waves
emanating from the final consumer. In nearly three decades of postwar
economic boom, American consumers have been increasingly extending their
borrowing limits to keep on buying more and more. To meet their demands,
corporations begin piling up debt at an accelerating clip (10, p. 48).
However, as corporations--more specifically, retailers--take on the cre-
dit pressure from the final consumers, they have to pass this same pres-
sure at some point in time onto their own suppliers. Steadily, this same
pressure ha* s t.ansmitted up the channel of supply. As the entire United
States economy approaches the borrowing limit, this pressure may sooner
or later fall onto the exporters overseas. With the United States as
its largest export market, Hong Kong could feel this immense pressure
once it. explodes.
Already signs of such pressure are emerging in Hong Kong. For
instance, a large local exporter has found that some overseas buyers
who have been buying on letter-of-credit terms are now asking for better
credit terms (21). From the macro-standpoint, the amount of bank loans
and advances to the export-oriented manufacturing and commerce sectors
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have climbed up considerably from 17.6 per cent of total annual exports
in December 1968 to 22.4 per cent in December 1974 as shown in Table 2.1..
If another liquidity crunch develops, it is highly doubtful whether or
not Hong Kong exporters can sustain this credit pressure.
TABLE 2, 1
ESTIMATED BANK LOANS TO HONG KONG EXPORT SECTOR
FOR THE YEARS 1968-1974
$HK Million
Loans as PercentageTotal AnnualLoans to Export SectorYear








Source: From data supplied in various issues of Hong Kong Monthly
Statistics Digest, a publication of Hong Kong Census and
Statistics Department
acomputed by adding 85 percent of loans to manufacturing
sector and 50 per cent of loans to import, export and
wholesale trade. These percentages are based on the
facts that 80 per cent to 85 per cent of Hong Kong's
manufacturing output is exported and that the annual
total export is roughly equal to retained import.
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2.3 Hong Kong Banking System to Meet
the Growing Credit Needs
The last seven to eight years saw the Hong Kong commercial
banking system growing into a well-developed and sophisticated service
industry. Loans and advances have increased very rapidly to cater to
the expanding and more diversified needs of the economy. Figure 2.2
presents the general picture of this development for the period 1968-
1974 inclusive. During this period, as the loans and advances continued
to rise more rapidly than the total deposits, the loan-to-deposit ratio
soared from 58 per cent in 1968 to 89 per cent in 1974.
The explanation for such a high loan-to-deposit ratio in 1973-
1974 is that some banks, notably banks that have overseas head offices,
have funded their local lending operations by borrowing abroad (18, p.
18). Consequently, these banks can have the total of advances and loans
exceeding the total deposits without failing to meet liquidity require-
ments. However, it would be a fallacious assumption to extend the argu-
ment for individual banks to the entire banking system. While the
basic soundness of the banking system as a whole should not be in se-
rious doubt, it does raise the question of whether or not the banking
system is indeed approaching its lending limit. In theory, the total
loanable funds in the banking system should not greatly exceed the
total deposits which the system holds.
The banking business is primarily an interest-differential busi-
ness and it is profitable only when a sufficient interest rate spread
can be made between its lending and borrowing activities. Normally
this spread is to cover the lending risk, operating expenses and some
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make an additional spread to take into consideration the cross-currency
risks incurred. Thus, if the entire system were to rely on overseas
sources as the marginal source of funds, then the prime lending rate in
Hong Kong would have to be higher than the corresponding rate at other
money centers, reflecting the necessary spread to cover the additional
cross-currency risks. A higher prime lending rate in Hong Kong could
only be imposed through foreign exchange control and tight monetary
policy. Apart from other considerations which make the above imposition
undesirable, the maintenance of a higher lending rate in Hong Kong,
with its built-in deflationary bias to the economy, is not at all ac-
ceptable. Therefore, in conclusion, a loan-to-deposit ratio of 100
per cent should seem a reasonable lending limit.
From Figure 2.2, it can be seem that as the present trends in
the growth of loans and deposits continue, the 100 per cent limit will
soon be reached. At the same time, it should be noted that proportions
of loans and advances to the manufacturing and commercial sectors res-
pectively have been on steady decline. One explanation is that the
commercial banking system is gradually diversifying its lending portfo-
lio to cover a greater variety of needs of the economy and to avoid the
risk of over-concentrating in certain lending activities. If these
present trends are indicative of future direction, then, as the demand
for credit rises considerably in relation to the annual total export,
the manufacturing and commercial sectors at the same time have a di-
minishing share of the total bank loans and advances. Furthermore, the
situation will be aggravated by the expected rate of rise in loans and
advances to level off as the loan-to-deposit ratio exceeds 100 per cent.
Therefore, there are good reasons for legitimate doubts about whether or
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not the banking system will be able and willing to meet the growing credit
needs in the near future. Hence, if there is ever a sudden increase in
the demand for credit terms of sales for Hong Kong's exports, the impact
on Hong Kong's economy could be utterly devastating.
At this point, it will help to understand the magnitude of the
impact by going through a calculation. Suppose in 1975 some American
buyers who were paying before by the 'sight' letter of credit insist on
sixty-day credit payable in D/A (documents against acceptance) terms. By
granting this demand, the exporters would need to finance the transactions
for an extra period of about ninety days--that is, two-month credit plus
one month in the shipment of goods--before they receive payments. Suppose
the total value of these sixty-day credit sales accounts for ten per cent
of annual total exports. If annual total exports for Hong Kong in 1975
are conservatively estimated to be HK$30,000 million, then the additional
financing required by the exporters on the average and recurrent basis
would come up to $30,000 million x 3/12 x 10% or HK$750 million. The fol-
lowing tabulation shows a few combinations for various credit terms and
various amounts of additional credit sales as percentages of total annual
exports.
TABLE 2.2 ADDITIONAL FINANCING REQUIRED UNDER
VARIOUS CREDIT TERMS AND FOR VARIOUS AMOUNTS
AdditionalAmount of Credit Sales asExtended
Financingof Total Annual ExportsCredit Term







Compared with the amount of total deposits--for example, HK$30,
000 million--the additional financing needed would vary from 2.5 per cent
($750 million) to 6.7 per cent ($2,000 million). If the banking system
were to supply the extra financing needs, the liquidity stress on the
banks would be inordinately large.
Indeed, when considering the various trends as postulated in the
foregoing paragraphs, it would appear that the banking system would not
be able and willing to fill this widening credit gap. Briefly, these
trends are recapitulated as follows:
1. The banking system's lending ceiling will be fixed by the total de-
posits of the banking system.
2. The rates growth of deposits and annual total exports will be of the
same magnitude. As a matter of fact, from Figure 2.2 it can be seen
these two amounts are more or less equal except for the two-year pe-
riod of 1972-1973 when there was a large influx of overseas deposits.
3. Banks continue to reduce the proportion of the total loans and ad-
vances they make to the manufacturing and commercial sectors with
the gradual diversification of the bank loan portfolios.
4. Mounting pressure would be felt by Hong Kong exporters to give exten-
sion of credit terms. As time goes on, more sales will have to be
carried out on a credit basis.
In this limited study, it is not possible to project the levels
of this credit gap for the next fix years. The gap depends on a number
of factors: the rates of growth in bank deposits, loans and advances,
and in export trade, as well as the timing and amount which the exporters
have to grant these requests, will all affect the level to be determined.
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However, the order of magnitude of the financing gap as stipulated in
Table 2.1 appears to be a reasonable estimate for 1975. With the passage
of time, it is further expected this potential credit gap will widen.
Of course, in the long run, this potential credit gap could be
worked out by the classical economic forces of supply and demand. When
the ex ante demand for credit rises faster than the ex ante supply, the
interest rate rises. Meanwhile, the higher interest rate attracts de-
posits from local and overseas sources. However, given the assumptions
of a fully loaned-up banking system and of an unchanged ratio of public
holdings in cash and in bank deposits, the curtailment of potential cre-
dit needs will exert a deflationary bias on the future growth of the econ-
omy.
In conclusion the development of the bankers' acceptance market
could help to meet the rising credit demand of Hong Kong's economy. An
open-market of bankers' acceptances with an initial outstanding volume
of HK$500 million or more will be adequate to develop into an active mar-
ket. Thus the potential credit gap is sufficient by itself to supply the
necessary credit instruments for the market. However, before the analysis
of the pros and cons of such a market, it will be appropriate to focus
on an important issue in the financial sector--the need of a developed
money market for more efficient liquidity adjustment. The next chapter
discusses this issue.
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3.0 LIQUIDITY ADJUSTMENT OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS IN HONG KONG
3.1 Liquidity Problem of Financial
Institutions in Hong Kong
In conducting daily business transactions, business firms at all
times have to keep sufficient cash on hand to meet various demands for
payment. At times, when the demand for payment is exceptionally heavy,
companies must have recourse to short-term bank loans to meet payments when
they become due. At other times, however, companies may find themselves
with large sums of idle cash for short periods of time before certain pay-
ments are to be made. At these times, these companies may repay their bank
loans and put money into deposits. The commercial banks, by carrying out
the traditional role of deposit-taking and lending, perform the vital
economic function of helping business firms stay liquid.
The commercial banking system performs this function by pooling
the lqiuidity of various sectors and units of the entire economy. As dif-
ferent businesses have surplus cash at different times of the year, their
respective needs are therefore matched by having funds transferred from
surplus units to deficit units. In this capacity, banks act as the inter-
mediary to channel the transfer of funds and, at the same time, take away
the liquidity problem from business firms. However, the demands from
the surplus units of the economy and the demands from the deficit units
are often not exactly matched (12, p. 28), so that the banking system
collectively could run into either tight-liquidity or excess-liquidity
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situations. Consequently, by taking over the liquidity problem of the
economy, banks have to deal with their own problem of liquidity adjust-
ment whenever these circumstances arise.
In the 1950's and 1960's, the economic growth of Hong Kong took
place in a period of relatively cheap money. The fast expanding banking
system was able to respond to the growing credit needs of the commercial
sector. In general, up to the late 1960's, banks in Hong Kong had main-
tained a strong liquid position so that the problem of liquidity was not
too much of a worry. Banks usually placed their excess funds with other
banks abroad or in other forms of foreign investment.
However, the rapid expansion of both trade and financial services
in Hong Kong in recent years has gradually taken up the slack in the cre-
dit supply. The rapid rise in the demand for loans and advances has out-
paced the rise in deposits as shown in Table 3.1. Subsequently, signs of
TABLE 3.1

















Source: Hong Kong Census Statistics Department, Hong Kong Monthly
Digest of Statistics, various issues from 1970 to 1974.
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stress in the liquidity position of banks have emerged. The Hong Kong
banks' net balances held in banks abroad have rapidly been drawn down to
meet local credit needs (as displayed in Table 3.2). In fact, the net
balance held abroad by the banking system was, for the first time in many
years, in debit in November 1974. The ratio of specified liquid assets to
deposits has also declined from 51.7 per cent in 1969 to 44.9 per cent in
1974 (18, p. 17, Table 16).
TABLE 3.2
OVERSEAS BALANCES WITH BANKS ABROAD
HELD BY BANKS IN HONG KONG
HK$ Million
Balances due from Net BalancesBalances due toAs at End of













Sources: Hong Kong Census Statistics Department, Hong Kong Monthly
Digest of Statistics, various issues from 1970 to 1974.
To adjust their individual liquidity positions, banks have relied
mainly on the inter-bank call money market. Although the last eight years
witnessed the rapid expansion of the inter-bank market, the size of this
market as a percentage of the total loans and advances outstanding fluc-
tuated between 13 per cent and 23 per cent. In fact, this percentage has
declined somewhat from the maximum of 23 per cent, while loans and advances
continued to expand, as shown in Table 3.3.
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TABLE 3.3
INTER-BANK LENDING ACTIVITIES AS COMPARED TO
TOTAL LOANS AND ADVANCES
HK$ Million unless
otherwise stated
Ratio of Inter-Inter-Bank Loansa Total LoansAs at End of Month
Bank to Total Loansand Advances




















Sources: Hong Kong Census Statistics Department, Hong Kong Monthly
Digest of Statistics, various issues from 1970 to 1974.
aThe average between the balances due to other banks and the
balances due from other banks in Hong Kong.
The cause of a not-very-active inter-bank money market was
underscored by a bank economist in Hong Kong. V. K. Ranganathan in the
Far Eastern Economic Review (April 1, 1974) stated that the duration of
inter-bank loans in HongKong did not extend beyond a day. In contrast,
the United Kingdom inter-bank market had loan maturities extending over
much longer periods. It was also noted that the inter-bank dealings
had grown to mammoth proportions in the European money markets
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when short-term funds were in great demand. However, the above trends
had not occurred in hong Kong. Therefore, he recommended that the Hong
Kong inter-bank market ought to emulate the practices of London banks by
structuring inter-bank loans for longer periods, and this in turn would
remove to some extent the uncertainty associated with the availability
of short-funds, as well as the market fluctuations in the inter-bank
interest rate (11, p. 45). From the above observations, it can be seen
that the Hong Kong inter-bank money market has not achieved the versatil-
ity and sophistication of its counter-parts in other developed money cen-
ters. From the banks' viewpoint, an inter-bank money market of a wider
range of maturities and of less marked rate fluctuations could do much to
alleviate the banks' liquidity management problem. As the result of the
inadequacy of the local inter-bank money market to meet the banks' liquid-
ity needs, it is not unexpected that a number of banks have resorted to
overseas sources to adjust their liquidity.
Commercial banks are not the only financial institutions in Hong
Kong that have to rely on overseas sources for liquidity adjustment. To
a greater degree, some merchant banks in Hong Kong oftentimes rely heavily
on the Euro-dollar and Asian-dollar markets. Most merchant banks have
not been able to get liquidity provision from commercial banks as they
are seen by the latter as direct competitors for banking business. These
merchant banks and some finance companies have therefore pooled together
their liqudity, forming an inter-finance-company money market. However,
the size of this market is too small to contribute significantly to liquid-
ity adjustment.
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3.2 Financial Institutions and Short-Term
Capital Movements
Prior to the 1970's, Hong Kong could maintain a relatively low
interest rate structure to help the rapid expansion of trade. However,
such a low-rate structure can no longer be maintained to-day. Increasing-
ly, interest rates in Hong Kong have to stay in line with movements of
interest rates in other money centers.
In the early months of 1973, Hong Kong's prime lending rate was
raised over and above the U.S. prime, as a result of a large outflow of
funds through the foreign exchange market. Towards the end of 1973 and
for the most part of 1974, successive increases in Hong Kong interest
rates were necessary to stop further outflow of capital as interest rates
at major financial centers remained at exceptionally high levels.. How-
ever, towards the end of 1974, Hong Kong interest rates were forced to
cut back sharply because of strong demand for the Hong Kong dollar and
the weakening position of the U. S. dollar (18, pp. 19-20). In view of
these recent developments, it appears that the movement of interest rates
in Hong Kong is heavily subjected to pressures of short-term capital
flows in either direction.
Given the complete absence of foreign exchange control in the
foreign exchange market, these short-term capital movements are under-
standable. The increase in the number of money brokers and merchant
banks since late 1971 has much to do with this development. Through
money brokers and also some merchant banks, large business firms in Hong
Kong have gained easier access to the Asian- and Euro-dollar markets.
Moreover, it is suspected that their presence also facilitates a consid-
erable amount of arbitrage and speculative activities. As a result,
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these factors have given added impetus to the flow of short-term capital
whenever opportunities lend themselves to such activities. These large
and sudden movements of short-term funds have made it much more difficult
for banks to manage their liquidity position. Also, because of a rela-
tively thin foreign exchange market in Hong Kong, large movements could
cause exchange rates to move frantically in the exchange market. For
instance, the U. S. dollar, the most actively traded currency in the
foreign exchange market, can suffer wide rate fluctuations by a mere
US$3 or 4 million (about HK$15 or 20 million) bid or offer in the Hong
Kong foreign exchange market.
3.3 Money Market Developments in Hong Kong
The problems of liquidity adjustment and short-term capital move-
ments could both be alleviated by the presence of a well-developed money
market. A money market with a broad range of instruments of various
maturities and qualities should provide better means for liquidity ad-
justment than an inter-bank call money market could offer. Also, as
most of these instruments will be denominated in Hong Kong dollars, such
a market would eliminate the cross-currency risks inherent in any overseas
instruments. Of course, a well-developed money market is broad, deep,
and resilient it is characterized by small price changes and large
quantity turnover (3, p. 389). Such a market improves both the alloca-
tional efficiency and the operational efficiency of the economy.
In addition to providing liquidity adjustment to commercial banks,
a well-developed money market is accessible to other financial institutions
and non-financial corporations in Hong Kong. With more local investment
and borrowing options, investors will turn to use the local market more
frequently than the overseas markets. While Hong Kong's short-term money
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rates will be subjected to the same fluctuations as those of other cen-
ters, local funds will be less ready to leave Hong Kong, thereby stabi-
lizing the outflows of short-term capital.
At the same time, the presence of a well established money mar-
ket in Hong Kong could.attract inflows of short-term capital to Hong Kong
and strengthen the supply of liquidity accordingly (though such liquidity
can readily dry up in tight money periods). Its geographical location in
the South-east Asian and Pacific regions, its political stability and the
absence of foreign exchange control are plus factors which will further
attract hot-money in times of political and financial turbulences abroad.
The development of an efficient and broad market will certainly attract
some funds which hitherto have found shelter in Singapore and Switzerland.
Ultimately, its presence will consolidate Hong Kong's position as a re-
gional financial center.
In a discussion of pre-requisites required for developing an or-
ganized money market within a centralized banking system, W. M. Scammell,
in The London Discount Market, points out certain conditions that have to
be satisfied in the first place (4, pp. 76-77). Essentially, when applied
to the Hong Kong context, they boil down to the following conditions:
(1) a considerable number of financial and quasi-financial institutions
to hold assets of graded liquidity (on a liquidity scale), (2) a desire
among these institutions to switch these assets frequently to adjust their
cash position, (3) a considerable number of dealers specialized in partic-
ular assets so as to make the market for these instruments, (4) a suffi-
cient number of these assets or instruments of differing maturities and
qualities and (5) a sufficient number of participators in the market at
all times to ensure the liquid quality of these instruments.
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While these conditions do not automatically guarantee the suc-
cess of a money market, they should at least provide a basic framework
for its development. In gneral, Hong Kong has the potential to meet
these basic conditions, given that the necessary developmental efforts
are applied. The presence of seventy-four banks, approximately fifty
merchant banks, a number of money brokers plus over a thousand finance
companies in Hong Kong should undoubtedly meet the first requirement.
Moreover, the need for liquidity adjustment both in the banking and non-
bank institutions should also cause no concern for both groups' willing-
ness to take part in the market, thus ensuring the liquid quality of the
instruments. Furthermore, the open nature of Hong Kong's financial mar-
ket and foreign exchange market permits the supply of overseas funds to
improve the liquidity.
What remains to be developed is a sufficient number of these
short-term assets of differing maturities and qualities and the neces-
sary dealer-network to make the markets for these instruments. While
the financial resources and expertise are not in short supply--as some
of the most reputable merchant banks and investment banks have opened
shop in: Hong Kong--the formation of the dealer-network requires the
individual banks and financial institutions to see the benefits and
needs for such a concerted effort. Also, as it is not feasible to de-
velop a full range of liquid assets at one and the same time, the selec-
tion of a strategic instrument to build up the market is of utmost impor-
tance.
The bankers' acceptance would be well suited to initiate the de-
velopment of the money market. The primary objectives at this stage
would be to establish confidence in the money 'market and to familiarize
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the financial public with the participating institutions and their op-
erations. It is only when the investing and borrowing public is aware
of and becomes familiar with the presence and functions of the money
market before such a market can become active. Because of the underly-
ing nature of the bankers' acceptance paper, the inherent safety of this
instrument will be ideally suited to this leading role. Moreover, the
chance for speculation will be minimized as the instrument is only to
serve the genuine needs of trade and commerce. Therefore, in conclusion,
what remains to be established here is the feasibility of the market's
development in terms of the impacts, costs and benefits to the related
sectors of the economy.
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4.0 IMPACTS, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF A BANKERS'
ACCEPTANCE MARKET IN HONG KONG
4.1 Impacts on the Financial
Institutional Framework
Hong Kong's traditional money market has been characterized by
a stable, controlled structure. The Hong Kong Exchange Banks' Associa-
tion determines, for the guidance of member banks, the savings and time
deposit rates, and the call money rates. The leading banks also post
the best (prime) lending rate which other commercial banks usually fol-
low. In determining the money rates, banks have aimed at maintaining a
stable rate structure. Such a structure, it is claimed, reduces disorder
and confusion in banking business arising from frequent, marked fluctua-
tions in interest rates. Also, this agreement on rates has thus far pre-
vented--at least rate-wise--cutthroat competition among banks that might
be detrimental to preserving a sound, healthy banking system. Besides,
with less frequent changes in money rates, business companies have better
estimation of incurrable interest costs.
As a result of this cartel arrangement, money rates are less
susceptible to minor daily fluctuations that are characteristic of a
free and open market. However, they are also less influenced by basic
trend movements prevailing in other world money centers. Normally Hong
Kong money rates tend to go up in successive steps, trailing behind the
steady rise of the world rates. Before banks can react accordingly, mas-
sive outflows of short-term funds may take place, seeking higher yields
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abroad. Conversely, substantial short-term capital may be repatriated
to Hong Kong as wor ldmoney rates take a long, steady dip.
These massive movements of interest-rate-sensitive funds im-
pose severe stresses and strains on the Hong Kong banking system. Large
fluctuations of the level of total banking deposits make the bank manage-
ment of its liquidity position difficult. Besides, massive movements of
short-term funds could disturb the foreign exchange market. Sharp and
unpredictable changes in the exchange rates could make banks' foreign
exchange dealings very risky. These changes also could affect the daily
operations of businesses that regularly make transactions in foreign
currencies.
The most important impact of the bankers' acceptance market may
be a gradual breakdown of the controlled, stable rate structure. The
banking system will have to compete for borrowers and depositors (in-
vestors) alike vis-a-vis the open market. To prevent substantial drain-
ing of short-term funds from the banking system and to keep customers to
continue borrow from banks, bank money rates will have to be more com-
petitively priced. In the long run, the competitive pressure from the
open market will undoubtedly minimize the banks' influence on money rate
fluctuations.
Basically, the open market for bankers' acceptances will be sub-
jected to market forces both internal and external to the economy. Lo-
cal supply and demand conditions for bankers' acceptances will undoubt-
edly play a dominant role in regulating market rates. However, with the
lack of foreign exchange control, arbitrage operations will more readily
transmit market movements of other money markets to this market. There-
fore, it is expected that the open market for bankers' acceptances will
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be a rather free, volatile market, sensitive to changes of world-wide
money conditions. To the extent that the money rates administered by the
Hong Kong Exchange Banks' Association will be tied competitively to the
movements of the open market discount rates, the former rates will also be
subjected to similar influences of world-wide money conditions. Such
influences on bank rates will be greater as the money market grows larger
and further develops, since then it will be less likely to be dominated
by any single local institution.
This important impact will have certain repercussions on the de-
velopment of the financial institutional structure. More frequent ad-
justment of money rates will have to be accepted by banks and customers
alike as the Hong Kong money rates become more responsive to world money
rate movements. As such, the incentive to conduct arbitrage operations
will be less. Therefore, rate-sensitive money flows would be expected to
stabilize. Accordingly, the level of the total banking deposits will
also stabilize, subjecting the banking system to less liquidity strains.
Also, the foreign exchange market will not be subjected to such external
pressures arising from these interest-rate-sensitive capital movements.
Another major impact of the formation of the bankers' acceptance
market will be the pooling of the entire economy's liquidity. First, as
Hong Kong's financial and commercial institutions will use more of the
local money market, the economy will benefit from the availability of this
additional liquidity. Next, different sectors of Hong Kong's financial
institutions have resorted to different means of adjusting liquidity.
Commercial banks have relied primarily on the inter-bank call money mar-
ket, and secondarily, in overseas funding sources and local swap arrange-
ment. The finance companies have relied on the inter-finance-company
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money market and other money markets overseas. However, except for a
number of these merchant banks that are off-shoots of large commercial
banks in Hong Kong, most finance companies have no way to adjust their
liquidity needs through commercial bank provisions.
With the open market for bankers' acceptances as a common liquid-
ity pool, the liquidity strains on each of the individual sectors can be
somewhat reduced. Institutional investors and borrowers would perceive
open market lending and borrowing as alternatives to bank borrowings and
lendings. Banks would find the open market an alternative as well as a
supplement to the inter-bank market. The finance companies would find it
a means of passing on -their liquidity problem to the common liquidity
pool. The collective liquidity pool, being an open and more impersonal
market, could reduce the artificial interventions similar to those that
might have developed in the inter-bank and inter-finance-company money
markets. Moreover, the broader base of market borrowers could lead to
allocational efficiency, since competitive bidding in the market place
tends to favor those who can afford the highest bids.
At the same time, the inter-bank call money market will reduce
its significance among the commercial bank inter-bank lendings as the
emergent bankers' acceptance market would provide an alternative means
of matching short-term liquidity needs. Also, marked fluctuations in
inter-bank call money rates will also be reduced as both the demand for
and supply of these call monies become more price-elastic.
The longer-term impacts of the formation of a bankers' acceptance
market could be quite far-reaching. When well established, this open
market should lead to further development of the money market. More
importantly, it should consolidate Hong Kong's position as a world
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financial center. Often, criticism has been leveled at Hong Kong that
it lacks a well-developed money market with supporting merchant-banking
activities. Following the development of the money market, the Hong
Kong financial institutional structure will in time gain in sophistica-
tion. Moreover, the presence of a well-developed money market would
improve the operational and allocational efficiencies of the market,
with the general welfare implications to Hong Kong's economy.
4.2 Cost-Benefit Analysis for Individual Sectors
Based on the foregoing assessment of the major impacts, this sec-
tion analyses the costs and benefits that these impacts will bring to
individual sectors of the economy. An analysis of costs and benefits
by sector is relevant here, because the overall costs and benefits will
be a weighted sum of costs and benefits of individual elements. More
importantly, the bankers' acceptance market will be feasible to the ex-
tent that these sectors and subsectors will accept or reject the idea.
Their individual decisions and action may support or thwart the develop-
ment of the bankers' acceptance market.
Commercial and Industrial Sector
The formation of the bankers' acceptance market will directly
affect only those large corporations that have access to the open market.
Smaller corporations do not usually have the name and the financial means
to enter the market hence they will have to continue to patronize the
commercial banks. Multi-national corporations, large subsidiaries of
foreign companies, large trading, wholesaling and manufacturing companies
would be the ones to gain benefits in using the acceptance market as both
an alternative source of funds and an alternative means of investment.
The use of bankers' acceptance financing will chiefly be connected with
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foreign trade in import and export financing. However, other possible
uses of acceptance financing should not be excluded. Multi-national
corporations could make use of acceptance financing for intra-company
shipments within the region and with other regions, thereby raising
working capital for their multi-national operations. Another potential
use of acceptance financing would be in domestic trade. Large trading
companies could resort to bankers' acceptances to finance smaller manu-
facturers in their working capital needs. Wholesalers may also make use
of bankers' acceptances to extend credit to small retailers.
Besides providing a trade financing alternative, the existence
of a bankers' acceptance market should help to reduce the borrowing cost,
directly and indirectly. Bills and letters of credit are usually dis-
counted by banks now at 2 per cent to 4 per cent above the prime lending
rate. Obviously, in the presence of an acceptance market, the cost of
discounting bills and letters of credit could be reduced. At times when
the acceptance market discount rate is below the prime lending rate, com-
mercial firms could do better by borrowing from the acceptance market
than by negotiating bank loans. Further, some commercial borrowers who
are not prime bank borrowers could borrow at prime rates from the ban-
kers' acceptance market, thus having the added advantage of using this
market. Lastly, the cost of bank borrowing could also be further reduced
because banks will have to adjust their lending rates competitively,
recognizing that borrowers could always turn to the acceptance market if
they (banks) should charge higher than market rates.
Oftentimes, the bankers' acceptance market would also provide
better investment yields for short-term funds. It would also
eliminate the cross-currency risk inherent in alternative investments in
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the Euro- and Asian-dollar markets. Furthermore, the formation of a
bankers' acceptance market would make financial managers more conscious
of interest costs and yields, realizing that better yields and lower
interest costs might be available on the open market.
By using the bankers' acceptance market to finance accounts re-
ceivables, material purchases and work in progress, corporations could
re-allocate a portion of the working capital for further investments
either in capital equipment or for business expansion. Of course, this
increased leverage of capital could materialize only when their total
debt capacity expands. This would mean their borrowing activities in
the open market do not significantly impair their ability to borrow from
banks.
The major drawback in using the bankers' acceptance market would
be the threat of severing the good-will established with the banks over
the years. Usually, banks lend to customers that have maintained long-
established relations. Perhaps very rightly, they would turn away bor-
rowers who only come to them when the money market is short of funds or
when the cost of bank borrowing is relatively cheap. On the other hand,
open market borrowing should not always be regarded as a reliable source.
It is probable that at times of tight money the open market could be
completely dried up. Corporations may therefore run into a major liquidity
crisis if they rely solely on the open market for funding. However, over
an extended period of time, most banks could finally come to accept a
certain degree of market participation from even their loyal customers.
Therefore, financial managers would have to learn to walk the borrowing
tight rope cautiously. Usually, their loan portfolio could be divided
up in a certain proportion, say 4:6, between open market borrowing and
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bank borrowing and when the money market offers a more attractive bor-
rowing rate, reverse this proportion to 6:4. This formula of switching
the loan portfolio is a common practice in the United States where there
is a well-developed money market. There is no reason why a modified ver-
sion cannot be applied in Hong Kong.
Non-Bank Financial Sector
The impacts of the bankers' acceptance market on the non-bank
financial institutions will be favorable. These institutions can then
resort to the open market for investing short-term funds. Among the
various types of non-bank financial institutions, merchant banks will
probably benefit most from the establishment of the bankers' acceptance
market. Acceptance financing is traditionally a merchant-banking acti-
vity, and Hong Kong has no lack of merchant banks having the necessary
expertise to go into this type of business. In fact, many merchant banks
that have established offices in Hong Kong are branches of prestigious
accepting houses in the United Kingdom and of large investment banks in
the United States.
In acceptance financing, the merchant banks then act as an inter-
mediary instead of principal in financing transactions and hence eliminate
the funding problem for themselves. Moreover, acceptance financing could
offer an effective means of establishing valuable corporate customers
contacts. Through these contacts, merchant banks could make a substantial
inroad in the corporate business sector by offering the full-range of
merchant banking services. At the same time, merchant banks and money
dealers could get together to form a money market dealing network by
initially starting out as dealers in bankers' acceptances. This could
provide a basis for expanding into the finance company paper market and
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negotiable certificates of deposits issues.
Commercial Banking Sector
With the formation of the bankers' acceptance market, commercial
banks could lose much corporate business to merchant banks. Substantial
amounts of deposits in the commercial banking system will also be drained
into the open market for bankers' acceptances a portion of their cor-
porate lending will also be diverted into the open market.
More importantly, the profit margins of commercial banking busi-
ness will be further squeezed. During periods of cheap money, corpora-
tions tend to borrow more from the market. During periods of tight money,
they will borrow more from the banks. Consequently, commercial banks
will be doing less business when money is cheap (and the profit margin is
high) and will be doing more business when money is tight and expensive
(and the profit margin shrinks or even becomes negative). The more bank
rates remain non-responsive to the open market fluctuations, the deeper
this whipsaw cuts into bank profits.
On the other hand, the bankers' acceptance market will greatly
facilitate the banks' liquidity management problem. By matching their
short-term asset and liability requirements in the market place, banks
could operate with reduced liquidity risks. Moreover, as the inter-bank
money rates will even out some of the marked flucutaions, banks could
further reduce their liquidity risks since they could better predict
changes in inter-bank call money rates. Another benefit is the better
prediction of the foreign exchange rates as well as the total deposit
level, helping the management make better decisions in these two areas.
Also, as bankers' acceptances become readily discountable in the open
market and hence more liquid, banks will be more willing to hold them in
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lieu of cash. The reason for this preference is that the bankers' ac-
ceptance could provide higher yields in a highly liquid form.
Other cost-benefit considerations are more complex and less uni-
formly distributed over the entire commercial banking sector. The break-
down of the cartel arrangement of the stable money rate structure and
the reduced importance of the inter-bank call money market will have
different cost-benefit implications for different banks. Each bank not
only considers the effects these impacts will bring about to its own
competitive advantages/disadvantages but also to its competitors' advan-
tages/disadvantages. Ultimately, the basic consideration is how the
bankers' acceptance market could affect its own relative gains and mat-
ket share.
The basic difference in individual banks' considerations can be
boiled down to the effects of the bankers' acceptance market on their
marginal cost of funds. Some banks in Hong Kong have built up very high
loan-to-deposit ratiosl (these ratios could be very much in excess of
one-hundred per cent) and some others have relatively low ratios (perhaps
sixty to seventy per cent). Hence, banks with a high loan-to-deposit
ratio can only fund their lending operation through the inter-bank call
money market, the Euro-dollar and Asian-dollar markets, and, to a lesser
extent, swap arrangement with local big business firms. Therefore, their
marginal cost of funds would be either a weighted average of the costs
from these marginal sources or simply the most accessible one at a par-
ticular time period. On the other hand, banks with a rather low loan-to-
1The exact figures for individual banks' loan-to-deposit ratios
are not available. Nonetheless, the bankers the writer interviewed
usually confirm the ranges of values cited above.
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deposit ratio can fund their lending operation out of their deposits.
So, for this latter category of banks, the marginal cost of funds is
simply the weighted cost of the total deposits they have on hand (as-
suming that there are no other high-yield sources for investment).
Obviously, banks in the former category (a high loan-to-deposit
ratio) tend to prefer a more responsive money rate structure as well as
an open market for bankers' acceptances. This open market could offer
them an alternative to meet their customers' financial needs, reducing
their own reliance on the volatile inter-bank call money market. A less
controlled and less stable money rate structure will give them greater
individual liberty to adjust money rates according to market demand and
supply conditions rather than according to what the cartel fixes. Banks
in the latter category, however, tend to prefer the existing arrangement
since the controlled structure allows them to maintain a more stable and
lower deposit rate structure than otherwise would be possible with the
bankers' acceptance market. Moreover, as predominantly net lenders in
the inter-bank call money market, these banks will see little advantage
in reducing the marked fluctuations in these rates. So these net lenders
would likely reject the idea of a bankers' acceptance market since it
would benefit their competitors much more than themselves.
However, in the longer-term perspective, the formation of the
bankers' acceptance market should be beneficial to the banking sector as
a whole. Improved stability in the foreign exchange market, a more de-
veloped and efficient money market plus a more sophisticated financial
institutional structure should further consolidate Hong Kong's position
as a world financial center. The commercial banks, being the mainstay
of the economy, could benefit more than other types of institutions in
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this development. Therefore, this could be a better alternative in
growth terms than the existing framework--an over-banked economy with
a restrictive and not-so-competitive banking structure--can promise.
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5.0 CONCLUSION
5.1 Summary and Conclusion
Summary
This feasibility study has established the need for a bankers'
acceptance market to fill the widening potential credit gap in Hong Kong's
export trade financing. The study has also proposed that the bankers'
acceptance, as a short-term liquid asset, could also serve to regulate
the liquidity needs of Hong Kong's financial institutions.
However, the formation of the bankers' acceptance market could
have several major impacts on Hong Kong's economy. The first major im-
pact would be a gradual breakdown of the cartel arrangement of money
rates, resulting in a freer, less stable and more sensitive money rate
structure which would be more in line with money rate movements in other
major money centers. The second major impact would be the formation of
the bankers' acceptance market as a collective liquidity pool for all
financial institutions, fostering the liquidity inter-linkage of various
financial sectors. The third impact would be the reduction of the inter-
bank call money market's dominant role as the single important source of
regulating bank liquidity and that its rate fluctuations would become
less marked. The fourth impact would be of a long-term nature: the de-
velopment of an active bankers' acceptance market would eventually contri-
bute-to Hong Kong's development as a world financial center.
Summing up various benefits and costs of a bankers' acceptance
market, the benefits seem to outweigh the costs in the final analysis.
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For the commerce sector, the main benefits of a bankers' acceptance mar-
ket are to provide an alternative source of trade financing at reduced
costs as well as a means for short-term capital investment at higher
yields. For the non-bank financial sector, the bankers' acceptance mar-
ket will provide a more easily accessible means for liquidity adjustment,
thereby allowing the finance companies and merchant banks to establish
themselves in the financial institutional framework of Hong Kong. For
the commercial banks, a major benefit is the creation of a liquid short-
term asset in the form of the bankers' acceptance. At the same time,
with less marked fluctuations in the inter-bank call money rates, in the
level of total banking deposits and in the rates of foreign exchange,
the management of liquidity and foreign exchange positions could be much
easier.
The costs of a bankers' acceptance market will have to be borne
chiefly by the commercial banking sector. Backed by the access to li-
quidity in the bankers' acceptance market, merchant banks will augment
their gathering strength in the corporate banking business. Commercial
banking profits will be further squeezed in the face of open-market com-
petition. Moreover, quasi-central banking activities can be frustrated
with a less controllable and more open market for short-term assets.
On the other hand, the commercial firms may find the acceptance market
not a reliable source of funds, particularly in times of tight liquidity.
Conclusion
Summing up the impacts, costs and benefits, it seems that the
development of a bankers' acceptance market in Hong Kong is feasible--
at least on a theoretical basis. There is a ready supply of a credit
instrument which arises out of the legitimate need to finance Hong Kong's
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export trade also, there is a ready demand for the same credit instru-
ment for use as a vehicle for adjusting domestic liquidity.
However, from opinions expressed by some bankers in private inter-
views--whose names are withheld by request--it seems that the bankers'
acceptance market, although theoretically sound, may not be feasible in
practice. It was pointed out that if the bankers' acceptance market was
to provide a domestic liquidity source, acceptances dealt in the market
should be denominated in Hong Kong dollar. First, it is highly unlikely
that the Hong Kong dollar will ever be accepted by overseas parties as a
medium of payment in a majority of export-trade transactions. Second,
any attempt to start off a local market would be utterly futile without
the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank's support, which holds a majority of the
total Hong Kong dollar deposits.
The first problem can be overcome by a swap arrangement) tied
into a bankers' acceptance transaction. With a matching foreign-currency
swap, a foreign-currency acceptance can be used to furnish local dollars
to an exporter or any borrowing firm. By the same transaction, the ban-
kers' acceptance has become a domestic-currency short-term liquid asset.
However, some bankers have doubted the usefulness of an acceptance-
swap instrument. It has been argued that a swap can usually be arranged
by itself without being tied to a bankers' acceptance. Therefore, the
accompanying bankers' acceptance would seem somewhat redundant. Never-
theless, a case can still be made for the acceptance-swap arrangement.
The swap arrangement by itself is not a credit instrument, though admit-
tedly it can be used to furnish the Hong Kong dollar. However, because
!lA swap is an agreement between two parties to exchange one cur-
rency for another and, after a period of time, to return the same amount
of currencies to their original owners.
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of an inactive forward exchange market in Hong Kong, the spread between
bid and offer in a forward contract must necessarily be high. Hence,
the effective costs of borrowing by a swap arrangement are relatively
high. By tying a swap contract and a bankers' acceptance together to
form a single instrument, the transaction costs can be reduced. Also,
with an active acceptance market, the effective cost of the accompanying
swap transaction will diminish. Moreover, the swap arrangement is not the
same as a money market instrument: a swap is not as liquid as the
acceptance-swap instrument. Also, the bankers' acceptance rates are
posted in the money market and hence standardised, whereas a swap rate
is usually not.
The second argument seems less easy to refute. It has been es-
timated that the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation (more commonly
called the Hong Kong Bank), together with Heng Sang Bank (its 51 per cent
owned subsidiary), holds over 50 per cent of the total banking deposits
in Hong Kong. If the Hong Kong Bank does not give its support to the
bankers' acceptance market (mainly by refusing to channel funds into
this market), the supply of liquidity to this market would be reduced
to a trickle. As such, the bankers' acceptance market will not be able
to thrive.
Although the Hong Kong Bank's position on the issue of a bankers'
acceptance market has not been procured, the cost-benefit analysis indi-
cates that the bankers' acceptance market may have adverse implications
on the bank's profitability. As the largest deposit holding commercial
bank in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Bank is constantly in a highly liquid
position. Consequently, it has been a major lender in the inter-bank
call money market.
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The formation of a bankers' acceptance market would have an un-
favorable impact on the Bank's profits. The breakdown of the cartel
arrangement would exert an upward pressure on the deposit rates and' a
downward pressure on the prime lending rate. Being the largest deposit
taker, the Bank would also be more adversely affected than other commer-
cial banks. Also, the decline of the inter-bank call money market would
affect the Bank's control of liquidity as the largest net lender in this
market. At the same time, as finance companies and merchant banks en-
croach on certain banking activities, the Bank's dual role as the lead-
ing financial institution and a quasi-central bank would have less signi-
ficant power and strength. Therefore, it is not likely that the idea of
developing a bankers' acceptance market would appeal to the Hong Kong
and Shanghai Bank.
The conclusion can be reached at this stage that the feasibility
of the bankers' acceptance market is conditional on the support of the
Hong Kong Bank. However, because of afore-mentioned considerations,
support will unlikely to be forthcoming from the Bank itself.
Nevertheless, a case for the bankers' acceptance market can be
put forward to the Hong Kong Government. If the Government could bring
itself to see the benefits as far outweighing the costs of setting up
such a market, it may try to pressure the Hong Kong Bank, as a quasi-
central banking institution, to support the market. At the same time,
the Government may allow the bankers' acceptance to be re-classified as
a highly liquid asset (as defined in the Banking Ordinance, Chapter 155,
Part V,-Section 18, Item (3)). Moreover, the Government could waive the
withholding tax on interest yields derived from investments in this mar-
ket to stimulate demand.
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From the overall viewpoint, merchant banks would likely be the
group most interested in developing this market. Perhaps, some of the
larger merchant banks could make a case for the bankers' acceptance
market for presentation to the Government for approval and support.
However, in the final analysis, the Hong Kong Government and the Hong
Kong Bank will be responsible for the success or failure in establishing
and developing the market.
5.2 Methodology, Limitations, and Areas
for Further Research
This feasibility study was mainly conducted through book research
for the substantive background information about the bankers' acceptance
market in the United States and the bill market in the United Kingdom.
The public and university libraries have been searched for relevant
materials. In addition, several major banks and investment banks in the
United States have supplied additional publications and reading materials
on the United States bankers' acceptance market.
Personal interviews werealso carried out. These interviews were
largely unstructured this was necessary because of the diverse nature
of the topic involved. However, as the bankers' acceptance has not re-
ceived wide interest and attention of the financial public, specific
views and ideas about its feasibility are difficult to obtain. Therefore,
reasoning and arguments were primarily relied upon to come up with the
evaluation of the impacts and the cost-benefits analysis.
Financial data and statistics are always difficult to get in
Hong Kong. All available data are derived from various publications of
the Government departments, mostly from the Department of Census and
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Statistics. Other data sources are almost non-existent.
Naturally, limitations are numerous and certain deficiencies
seem almost glaring to the scholar's eyes. Some information was verbally
gleaned and further validation and vigorous proof have not been possible.
Some of these deficiencies could be made up with further research efforts
if more time could be alloted for expanding the major propositions of the
thesis. However, as there severe limitations to the time and effort ex-
pendable in a thesis of this nature, a tentative conclusion on the feasi-
bility in the light of the limited information and knowledge available
has been attempted. Furthermore, there are important gaps in the statis-
tical information, either because such statistics have never been collected
or because these statistics have never been disclosed by the parties con-
cerned.
Several areas for further research and work are suggested as
follows:
1. Statistics regarding the trends of growth of imports, exports, na-
tional income, banking deposits and loans should be gathered and
analyzed to project the potential credit gap under various assumptions
of export trade financing needs.
2. Sectorial flow of funds accounts should be compiled for the economy.
The flow of funds accounts are indispensable for understanding de-
velopments and interrelationships in the financial marketplace.
3. Mechanics involved in generating, processing, buying and selling ac-
ceptances should be examined in detail and then standardised to faci-
litate implementation. Expert legal advice must be sought on the
legal complications arising from bankers' acceptance transactions.
4. A case for the bankers' acceptance market should be written for
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presentation to the Government for approval and support of the market
development. In addition, two major problems deserve attention:
(i) The possibility of waiving the interest withholding tax to
stimulate the demand for acceptances.
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